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NOTES AND COMMENTS
goods ... .,,8 The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Tufts v. Grif-
fin,9 which was decided seven years after the passage of the con-
ditional sales recordation statute, states that the vendee has a right to
the "actual legal and rightful possession" with a right to the title
upon payment of purchase price; and further, that the "vendor
could not interfere with possession 'until a failure to perform con-
dition.'"
Therefore, it appears that the court in taking one type of trans-
action and placing it in the category of another transaction, then giv-
ing it all the attributes of this other transaction-a dangerous pro-
cedure at best-has adopted a theory which cannot be supported by
direct authority in our own or in other jurisdictions.
WILLIAM MEDFORD.
Constitutional Law-Protection of Rights Acquired in
Reliance on Overruled Decision.
A significant factor in the change and growth of Anglo-American
law is the overruling of prior judicial decisions. The overruling
process, though unquestionably salutary in the course of time, en-
genders immediate difficulties. One of these difficulties-the adjust-
ment of acts done and rights vested in reliance on the decision over-
ruled-faced the United States Supreme Court in the case of Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co.1
The Supreme Court of Montana, in Doney v. Northern Pacific
Ry. Co.,2 had indicated a certain procedure to be followed by shippers
in suits against carriers to recover overcharges for freight. Plaintiff
in the Great Northern case, in bringing suit against defendant car-
rier, had followed the procedure indicated in the Doney case. On the
appeal of the Great Northern case to the Montana Supreme Court,
that tribunal held that the rulings of the Doney case were erroneous,
and would not be followed in the future, but that nevertheless they
'UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALEs Acr §2. See (1922) 2 ORE. L. REv. 1 for
discussion of the scope of the purpose of this act.
'Supra note 4. See also Whitlock v. Lumber Co., supra note 6, at 126,
58 S. E. at 911, where the court quotes with ipproval from 3 CENT. L. J. 413
as follows: "There is no doubt but that title and the right of property by
the terms of the note remained in the seller while possession and right to pos-
session were in defendant (buyer)." This was in the absence of a specific
provision in tie contract as to which party was to have possession.1 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358, 53
Sup. Ct. 145, 77 L. ed. (Advance Opinionj) 173 (1932).
"Doney v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 60 Mont. 209, 199 Pac. 432 (1921).
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were law until reversed and would control the rights of shippers and
carriers who had relied on them. The Montana court thus gave its
ruling a prospective effect but refused to give it a retrospective effect.
The carrier appealed to the United States Supreme Court, insisting
that the Montana court's judgment was unconstitutional as violating
due process of law. But it was held that the Montana court had not
transcended constitutional guaranties in defining the limits of its ad-
herence to precedent.
The difficulties attendant on the overruling of a decision are
traceable to varying theories of the judicial function, to the doctrine
of stare decisis, and to the efforts of the courts to protect vested
rights.
The classical Blackstonian postulates that law exists as a sort of
Platonic absolute or ideal and that judges can merely declare this
universal law through decisions which are no more than its evidence8
have been assailed for some time by the exponents of the antipodal
realistic view that judges can and do make law.4 Most courts, how-
ever, still purport to accept the Blackstonian or Declaratory theory.5
The logic of this theory demands not only that an overruled decision
be considered an erroneous declaration of the law and hence a nullity,
but also that the overruling decision be given a retroactive effect. 6
Constitutional guaranties against the retroactive effect of laws ex-
1 BL. CoMm. *68-72.
Judicial 'expressions of allegiance to the Blackstonian doctrine are man-
ifold. The following example from Ray v. Western Pennsylvania Natural
Gas. Co., 138 Pa. St. 576, 20 Atl. 1065, 1067 (1891) is typical: "The courts...
are not infrequently constrained to change their rulings .... In so doing
the doctrine is not that the law is changed, but that the court was mistaken
in its former decision, and that the law is, and really always was, as it is ex-
pounded in the later decision .... The members of the judiciary in no proper
sense can be said to 'make or change the law. They simply expound it and ap-
ply it to individual cases."
. See, for example, FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) 33, 121,
and 328; Frank, Are Judges Humanf (1931) 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 17, 233;
Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Comijhon Law (1917) 17 CoL L. REv. 593.
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SoURacEs OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1927) 232, 233: "The
only thing I am concerned with is the fact. Do the judges make Law? I
conceive it to be clear that, under the Common Law System, they do make
Law."
Justice Cardozo has said: "I take judge-made Law as one of the realities
of life." Quoted in FRANK, op. cit. supra at 328.
See infra note 18.
5 FRANK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 32; (1915) 29 HAav. L. REv. 80.
See quotation supra note 3, and Harbert v. Monongahela River R. Co.,
50 W. Va. 253, 40 S. E. 377 at 378 (W. Va. 1901). Freeman, Protection
Afforded Against the Retroactive Operations 2f an- Overruling Decision (1918)
18 CoL L. REv. 230 at 232.-
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tends only to the written law-i.e., statutes.7 Since contract and
property rights often vest on the faith of a judicial pronouncement,
courts feel an understandable reluctance in overruling a decision.
This reluctance has expressed itself in two courses of judicial con-
duct: (1) the courts resort to a stricter adherence to the doctrine of
stare decisis;8 (2) when justice requires that vested-rights be saved;
the courts pitch logic overboard and proceed to protect these
rights.9
The rule of stare decisis, binding on inferior courts and a per-
suasive moral force on supreme courts, has often impeded the health-
ful growth of the law.' ° The Declaratory theory with its logical
mandate of retroactivity causes a stricter adherence to stare decisis;11
because of this correlation, therefore, the Declaratory theory to-
gether with the rule of stare decisis unduly restrict the development
of the law through intelligent judicial pruning.12
"Although the language of the "municipil- bond cases" indicated that the
Supreme Court thought that to give an overruling decision a retroactive ef-
fect would violate the contract clause of the Constitution (see for example
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed. 520 (1864), and Douglass v. Pike
County, 101 U. S. 677, 25 L. ed. 968 (1880)), later cases have made it clear
that the prohibition against impairing the obligations of contracts applies only
to legislative acts and not to judicial decisions. Central Land Co. v. Laidley,
159 U. S. 103, 16 Sup. Ct. 80, 40 L. ed. 91 (1895) ; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S.
207, 16 Sup. Ct. 1023, 41 L. ed. 132 (1896) ; see GRAY, supra note 4, at 259.
Many state courts, however, have construed the municipal bond cases as
though they were decided under the contract clause. Freeman, supra note 6
at 236 and 243.
See Shepherd's Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, 134 N. C. 397, 399, 46
S. E. 748, 749 (1904).
The constitutional provision against ex post facto laws is directed against
legislative acts only and has no applicatioi to judicial decisions. Ross v. Ore-
gon, 227 U. S. 150, 33 Sup. Ct. 220, 57 L. ed. 458 (1913).
'Freeman, supra note 6, at 233; Kocourek, Retrospective Decisions and
Stare Decisis and a Proposal (131) 17 A. B. A. J. 180.
'See infra note 14.
" As applicable to this contention, witness thd following passages:
"It is safe to say that there are many hundreds of legal rules, especially
those of a ceremonial type, which by general consent of the bar need to be
overhauled. The obstructive influence of the rule of Stare decisis is beyond
calculation." Kocourek, supra note 8, at 180.
"The history of our law shows repeated instances where courts have failed,
through an unreasoning conservatism, to cut away technicalities utterly mean-
ingless and having their origin in conceptions long since passed away; and
the law as a science has suffered accordingly." Thayer, Judicial Legislation:
Its Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common Law (1891) 5
HARv. L. Rxv. 172 at 200. The last-quoted passage was not written on the
subject of stare decisis, but it is reasonable to believe that the learned author
implicitly recognized stare decisis as one of the causes of the "unreasoning
conservatism.'
' Kocourek, supra note 8 at 181.
"Ibid. There -s no intention of implying that the rule of stare decisis is
not desirable when it is intelligently, and not too strictly, applied.
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Some courts follow the Declaratory theory to its logical con-
clusion and do not interfere with the retroactive operation of the
overruling decision.' 3 Usually, however, rights acquired in reason-
able or justifiable reliance on the overruled decision are protected,
either upon the ground that the case before the court presents an
exception to the retroactive rule, or that citizens are entitled to rely
on judicial decisions and have their rights secured. 14 The approach
' Stockton v. Dundee Mfg. Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 56 (1871) ; Hibbits v. Jack,
97 Ind. 570 (1884) ; Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184, 30 Pac. 213 (1892) ; Storrie v.
Cortes, 90 Tex. 283, 38 S. W. 154 (1896) ;, Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W. Va.
172, 41 S. E. 193 (1902) -(court declares overruling decision retroactive, and
says that party's rights as fixed by overruled decision are not saved, but for
purposes of convenience in disposing of appeal allows result which would have
been dictated by overruled decision); Crigler v. Shepler, 79 Kan. 834, 101
Pac. 619 (1909).
In other cases, the decision was put upon the ground that no contract or
property rights had vested in reliance on the earlier decision. Center School
Township v. State ex rel. Board of School Com'rs, 150 Ind. 168, 49 N. E. 961
(1898); Mountain Grove Bank v. Douglas County, 146 Mo. 42, 47 S. W. 944
(1898) ; Lewis v. Symmes, etc., 61 Ohio St. 471, 56 N. E. 194 (1900) ; Gross
v. Board of Com'rs, 158 Ind. 531, 64 N. E. 25 (1902).
The following cases are also of interest: Swanson v. City of Ottumwa,
131 Iowa 540, 106 N. W. 9 (1906) ("There is no showing that appellant ...
relied upon any of the so-called opinions of this court. . . "); Herron v.
Whitely Malleable Castings Co., 47 Ind. App. 335, 92 N. E. 555 (1910)
(draws distinction between case where earlier decision enunciated an estab-
lished rule of property or contract, and case where decisions relied on are
"conflicting, not well considered, or made so recently ... that [the contract
or property right] could not reasonably be presumed to have been . .. ac-
quired upon the faith of the earlier decision"). Oliver Co. v. Louisville
Realty Co., 156 Ky. 628, 161 S. W. 570 (1913) foreign corporation that had
not complied. with law of forum unsuccessfully invoked stare decisis). See
Bradshaw v. Duluth Imperial Mill Co., 52 Minn. 59, 53 N. W. 1066 at 1068
(1892) (could have been no reliance on overruled case because of time of its
decision). And see Freeman, supra note 6, at 239.
"Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. St. 495 (1859) ; Haskett v. Maxley, 134 Ind.
182, 33 N. E. 368 (1863) ; Harris v. Jex, 55 N. Y. 421 (1874) ; Vermont & C. R.
Co. v. Verfnont Central R. Co., 63 Vt. 1, 21 Atl..262 (1890) ; Farrior v. New
England Mortgage Security Co., 92 Ala. 176, 9 So. 532 (1891); Hill v.
Brown, 144 N. C. 117, 56 S. E. 693 (1907). Freeman, supra note 6, 240 et scq.;
(1915) 29 -IA~v. L. Rxv. 80.
Mr. Freeman (supra note 6) after an exhaustive analysis of the cases, has
offered the following summary:
"1. In cases originating in the federal courts, the last decision of a state
court, overruling former decisions, will not be followed where to do so would
interfere with rights acquired in reliance upon the first decisions.
"2. The state courts, on one theory or another, almost universally pro-
tect property rights acquired in reliance upon a statute or constitutional pro-
vision as then interpreted by the courts. [Courts often say that the exception
to the retroactive operation of an overruling decision is limited to instances
in which the earlier decision or decisions construed constitutions or statutes,
and there was reliance upon such decision or decisions. Thus in Falconer v.
Simmons, supra note 13 at 196, it is said that "a mere decision expressive of
general or common law will not protect even a contract valid under that com-
mon law, tested by a prior decision, against the effect of a subsequent change
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of the North Carolina court to the problem has been typical. Al-
though recognizing, either expressly or by implication, the Black-
stonian rule that the overruling decision operates retrospectively, and
that the overruled decision is a nullity, the court has not failed to
uphold rights acquired by virtue of reliance on the first decision. 15
Some legal thinkers believe that the practical application of the
Declaratory theory, and its cognate doctrine, stare decisis, although
leading to "undesirable results in particular cases" works a "fairer
of decision." And see Wilkinson v. Wallace, 192 N. C. 156, 158, 134 S. E.
401, 402 (1926); (1927) 5 N. C. L. Rxv. 170, 171. But, as Mr. Freeman
points out, it would seem that the exception should be extended to changes in
construction of the common law as well as of written law; and some courts
have made such an extension. Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10
So. 635 (1891) ; Hill v. Brown, supra; par. 4 infra.]
"3. Men are not punished as criminals for acts which were done when the
highest court of the state had declared them lawful. ["Although it is settled
that the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws, like the provision
against impairing the obligation of contracts, prevents only legislative acts
and not judicial decisions, the courts, following a perfect analogy, should not
allow an overruling decision to operate retroactively, wherever a statut could
not do so." (1915) 29 HARv. L. REv. 80 at 82.]
"4. The tendency is to extend the same protection to rights acquired in
reliance upon decisions interpreting the common or unwritten law." See par. 2,
supra.
I State v. Bell, 136 N. C. 674, 49 S. E. 163 (1904) (earlier decision con-
struing statute overruled and a new construction announced for the future,
but defendant awarded new trial and permitted to attempt defense under law
of overruled case) ; Hill v. Brown, supra note 14 (overruling decision not
given retroactive effect on ground that law of earlier decision was "practically
a dormant stipulation in the contract") ; Fovle v. Ham, 176 N. C. 12, 96 S. E.
639 (1918) (decision overruling earlier case and making indexing of deeds
essential to registration not given retroactive effect, because parties had relied
on earlier decision) ; Wilkinson v. Wallace, 192 N. C. 156, 134 S. E. 401 (1926)
(holds that two former overruling decisions were prospective, not retrospective,
in effect as applied to facts presented; noted in (1927) 5 N. C. L. Rzv. 170;
see concurring opinion of Walker, J., in State v. Fulton, 149 N. C. 485, 491
63 S. E. 145, 146 (1908). In Ely v. Norman, 175 N. C. 294, 95 S. E. 543
(1918), three judges concurred in the result stated in the principal opinion
but added that a former decision of the court should be overruled. This
conclusion of the majority, however, operated only prospectively. See State
cx rel. Bryant Mfg. Co. v. Hester, 177 N. C. 609, 611, 98 S. E. 721, 722 (1919).
There are numerous expressions in North Carolina cases to the effect
that titles or vested interests acquired in reliance on earlier decisions will be
protected. See Hill v. Railroad, 143 N. C. 539, 573-582, 55 S. E. 854, 866-869
(1906) ; Young v. Jackson, 92 N. C. 144, 148 (1885) ; Kirby v. Boyette, 118
N. C. 244, 258, 24 S. E. 18, 19 (1896) ; Jones v. Williams, 155 N. C. 179, 189,
71 S. E. 222, 227 (1911) ; Threadgill v. Wadesboro, 170 N. C. 641, 644, 87 S.
E. 521, 522 (1916).
In Mason v. Nelson Cotton Co., 148 N. C. 492, 62 S. E. 625 (1908), the
court does not depart from the general rule that the overruling decision must
,be given a retroactive effect, saying that exceptions against retroactive opera-
tion should not be extended to an erroneous declaration of general mercantile
law.
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average of justice" in the long run.16 Others contend that it is de-
sirable to protect all rights that have vested from reliance on a ju-
dicial decision, and that judicial theory, as well as judicial practice,
should be shaped toward this end. 17 The latter view, it is believed,
is the more compelling. How, then, can the protection of all rights
against the retroactive operation of an overruling decision be rea-
lized? It has been repeatedly pointed out that the fictional theory
that judges do not make law should be abandoned.' 8 With the aban-.
donment of this theory will go the logical implication of retroactivity,
and an obstacle to enlightened judicial thought and action will be re-
moved. After the unqualified acceptance of the reality that judges
do make law, the bonds of the rule of stare decisis should be loosened
to the extent that the courts will not be cramped in effecting desirable
departures from precedent.
Admittedly it is futile to believe that such a metamorphosis of
juristic thought will occur in the near future. The Declaratory theory
is too firmly implanted in our case law to be uprooted without a great
deal more spading. Therefore, lest it be supposed that our avowed
aim of protecting all rights which have vested in reliance upon an
overruled decision is altogether illusory, other more practical means
of realizing this aim should be considered.
First, the courts may adopt the view that a judicial decision can
operate to deprive a person of his liberty or property without due
process of law.' 9  Since this view would require some recasting of
constitutional thought, it would not be altogether easy of realization,
but does not seem wholly impracticable.
In the second place, it has been suggested20 that a statute be
"Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort (1924) 37 HARV.
L. REv. 409.
'
7 Freeman, supra note 6.
"Austin alluded to the Blackstonian concept as a "childish fiction employed
by our judges, that judiciary or common law is not made by them, but is a
miraculous something made by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity and
merely declared from time to time by the judges." 2 AUSTIN, JURiSPiRUDENcE
(3d ed. 1869) 655. That Austin's views have found wide acceptance among
writers on jurisprudence, see Gray, supra note 4, at 222; Carpenter, supra
note 4 at 595.
FRAx, op. cit. supra note 4; Carpenter, supra note 4; (1915) 29 HARv. L.
REv. 80.
See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Co., 215 U. S. 349, 370, 30 Sup. Ct. 140, 147, 54 L. ed. 228, 238 (1909).
"' Freeman, op. cit. supra note 6, at 251.
' Kocourek, supra note 8, suggests the following statute:
"An Act Declaring the Effect of Judicial Decisions of the Supreme Court.
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adopted allowing a supreme court to decide a case by what it be-
lieves to be a more just rule than has theretofore been pronounced,
except where the former rule is the basis of reliance. The immediate-
ness with which the change would be made recommends this method.
Whether it would survive the criticism that it permits an invasion of
the judicial province by the legislature, however, is problematical.
A third way out of the dilemma is that which the Montana court
adopted in the principal case. That is, the court may announce a
new rule for regulating future transactions while applying the old
rule to the case being decided. One objection urged to this solvent
is that the announcement of the new rule-the prospective ruling-
must necessarily be only a dictum.2 ' However, it is believed that
this objection is not a serious one: the court may give a binding
effect to its prospective ruling if it so desires. The United States
Supreme Court now holds that the state's adoption of this view
does not abrogate due process. Although such a procedure does
violence to the Declaratory theory of the law, it has a definite prag-
matic sanction in that it allows the court to protect vested rights and
at the same time announce a more just rule to be followed in the
future. The course of the Montana court would doubtless be more
generally followed were it possible to give the coup de grace to
antiquated dogma and useless fiction.
W. J. ADAMS, JR.
Sec. 1. The final judicial decisions of the Supreme Court are
(a) Decisive of the rights of the parties.
(b) Declarative of the rules of law for future application which
govern the questions raised on the facts presented and decided.
See. 2. (1) If the Supreme Court believes that a declaration of rule of
law theretofore made by the Supreme Court or by any in-
ferior court is unjust, it will decide the instant case in ac-
cordance with the juster rule except
(a) Where the former rule is a basis of reasonable and justifiable
reliance applicab~le to the facts of the instant case, or
(b) Where application of a new rule in its judgment will be un-
duly disturbing to a standard of reasonable and justifiable
reliance as to the existence of non-existence of legal relations
of other persons not then before the court.
(2) When the Supreme Court refuses to depart from an existing
rule in favor of what it pronounces a juster rule on the ques-
tions adjudicated, the expression of that view is evidence for
future cases of the existence of reasonable reliance,
Sec. 3. Nothing herein shall abridge the duty of inferior courts to apply
the declarations of law made by superior courts."
n (1902) 15 HARv. L. REy. 667 at 668.
